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UK regulation of strike ballots and notices – Moving beyond ‘democracy’? 
 
Tonia Novitz  
 
 
Introduction 
 
From the 1980s onwards, the rhetoric of ‘democracy’ was used to justify industrial relations 
reform in the United Kingdom (UK), including the incremental addition of balloting and 
notice requirements for industrial action.1 The most recent Trade Union Act 2016 (UK) 
(‘TUA’) is remarkable, not only for more extensive balloting and notice requirements that 
aim substantially to reduce industrial action,2 but also a shift to a more obviously economic 
justificatory orientation. This blatant shift from principle to pragmatism can be linked to 
various financial concerns. One example is the Government’s appreciation of the potential 
economic shocks that could follow the ‘Brexit’ referendum as to whether Britain should 
remain in or leave the European Union (EU), which led to some concessions made to the UK 
trade union movement so as not to alienate an ally for the ‘remain campaign’.3 Another, 
examined more fully below, is the determination to reduce the budget deficit following the 
financial crisis.4 Additionally, and more worryingly, there is evidence that the TUA reforms 
follow a narrow economic neo-liberal agenda, planned some time before election of the 
Conservative Government, which aims to silence trade union protest in the UK.  
 
This article begins by explaining the current UK legal regime regarding  strike ballots and 
notices, noting the ways in which the TUA has modified the relevant rules. The democratic 
justifications given for introduction of this statutory matrix of balloting requirements in the 
1980s and subsequent amendments in the 1990s are then considered. Finally, the eclipse of 
‘democratic’ by ‘economic’ reasons for the TUA reforms is examined, alongside the future 
trajectory of legislative regulation of balloting and notice for industrial action in the UK. 
                                                          
 Professor of Labour Law, University of Bristol Law School e-mail: tonia.novitz@bristol.ac.uk. This is a 
revised version of a paper presented at the ‘Comparative Strike Ballots workshop’ hosted by the Labour Law 
and Relations Group at Sydney Law School in August 2015 and another presentation given at the British 
Universities Industrial Relations (BUIRA) conference on ‘The Trade Union Bill: Implications for Industrial 
Relations’ held in Manchester, UK, in November 2015. I am grateful for comments from participants at both 
events, my colleague at Bristol, Michael Ford QC, the anonymous referee and the editors. All errors and 
omission are my own.  
1 S McCrystal and T Novitz, ‘“Democratic” Preconditions for Strike Action: A Comparative Study of Australian 
and UK Labour Legislation’ (2012) 28(2) International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations 115 at 135-8. 
2 Alongside other measures, including scope for change to union political funds, union facility time in the public 
sector, collection of public sector trade union dues, the role of the Certification Officer and picketing practices. 
See M Ford and T Novitz, ‘An Absence of Fairness… Restrictions on Industrial Action and Protest in the Trade 
Union Bill 2015’ (2015) 44(4) Industrial Law Journal (ILJ) 522 at 523-4. At the time of writing, the TUA has 
royal assent, but the schedule for commencement of various provisions has not been announced. Many measures 
contemplated require secondary legislation and will be introduced incrementally.   
3 See financial warnings from the Bank of England and the International Monetary Fund: 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ad066f38-008f-11e6-ac98-3c15a1aa2e62.html#axzz48XZ52eQc. Regarding 
speculations that the (even) harsher provisions initially contemplated were abandoned due to cooperation from 
the Trades Union Congress (TUC) in promoting the case that the UK should stay in the EU, see 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/apr/28/david-cameron-unions-brexit-trade-union-bill-
brendan-barber. However, for reasons elaborated on below, this is likely to be a temporary ceasefire. 
4 For example, an intention to reduce public spending by £12 billion in order to reduce the budgetary deficit. 
Discussed below at text accompanying n 81 below et seq. 
2 
 
 
1. The current legal position regarding pre-requisites for lawful industrial action 
 
There is no positive entitlement to strike under UK common law. Instead, those employees 
who participate in strikes are usually viewed as being in breach of their contract of 
employment,5 while those who organise or participate in industrial action can consequently 
be liable in tort under common law.6 This highly vulnerable position is partially ameliorated 
by various statutory protections for employees and trade unions. The key statutory reference 
point is the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (UK) (‘TULRCA’), 
as amended by, amongst other  measures,  the TUA. 
 
TULRCA recognises scope for civil liability where a trade union has ‘authorised’ or 
‘endorsed’ the action in question, or at least has not repudiated the actions of its members,7 
subject to a ‘cap’ on compensation and scope for statutory immunity.8 Provision is also made 
for some protection from dismissal for participants, but this is subject to authorisation or 
endorsement of the action by the trade union whose members are engaged in the dispute and 
so is contingent on the potential exposure of the trade union to civil liability.9 Lockouts are 
regulated only to the extent that the period of automatic protection from dismissal (for 
industrial action called by a trade union and protected from civil liability) can be extended to 
take account of such action by the employer.10 The unreasonable refusal of an employer to 
take procedural steps to resolve the dispute may also lead to an extension of this period.11 
 
A lawful trade dispute, where the trade union has followed correct procedures regarding 
balloting and notice, can be regarded as exempt from the economic torts of inducement of 
breach of contract, interference with contract, conspiracy and intimidation.12 A lawful trade 
dispute must be ‘a dispute between workers and their employer which relates wholly or 
mainly to one or more’ of a list of matters set out in the statute.13 These concern various 
work-related subjects, such as terms and conditions of employment and termination. This 
formulation (alongside a second explicit statutory exclusion) precludes any secondary action 
in support of a dispute between other workers and their employer.14 The statutory wording 
also places ‘political disputes’ outside the scope of statutory immunity from tort.15 Industrial 
action must not relate to the terms and conditions that will apply to future employees or 
indeed future employers, having implications for action taken regarding the sale of businesses 
                                                          
5 Wilkins v Cantrell and Cochrane (GB) Ltd [1978] IRLR 483; Solihull Metropolitan Borough v NUT [1885] 
IRLR 211.  
6 Taff Vale Railway v Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901] AC 426. See H Carty, ‘Intentional 
Violation of Economic Interests: The Limits of Common Law Liability’ (1988) 104 Law Quarterly Review 250; 
and S Deakin and J Randall, ‘Rethinking the Economic Torts (2009) 72(4) Modern Law Review (MLR) 519.   
7 TULRCA ss 20-21. 
8 TULRCA s 22; although this cap may not extend to liability under EU law; see also TULRCA s 219. 
9 There is no need to establish statutory immunity in tort to claim selective dismissal under TULRCA s 238, but 
such immunity is required for the general protection of a striker from unfair dismissal for a limited period (set 
by statute currently at 12 weeks). See TULRCA s 238A. See McCrystal and Novitz, above n 1 at 136 and 142-
44. 
10 See TULRCA s 238A(7C).  
11 TULRCA s 238A(5)(c).   
12 TULRCA s 219. 
13 TULRCA s 244(1). 
14 See not only TULRCA s 244 but also s 224 and Dimbleby v. NUJ [1984] IRLR 161 (HL).  
15 See TULRCA s 244(1) and Mercury Communications Ltd v Scott-Garner [1983] IRLR 494. 
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or restructuring of public or corporate enterprises.16 It is therefore not the workers who 
collectively decide what they consider relevant to their interests; rather this is dictated by 
statute and determined by the courts that interpret the statute.  
 
There are also detailed balloting and notice provisions, which are elaborated upon in a Code 
of Practice.17 Previously a bare majority of those voting had to endorse their union’s 
industrial action in a ballot, but since the adoption of the TUA there will be a further 
requirement regarding turnout. At least ‘50% of those who were entitled to vote in the ballot’ 
have to do so for the ballot to be valid.18 In respect of ballots in ‘important public services’, 
the TUA has introduced provision for a further balloting requirement whereby at least 40% of 
those entitled to vote in the ballot must have given their approval (in addition to the 50% 
turnout threshold and the requirement of a majority of those voting supporting the action).19 
Regulations will specify to which ‘important public services’ this rule applies. At the time of 
writing the draft Regulations published indicate that the following categories of services will 
be covered by this additional requirement: (a) health services; (b) education of those aged 
under 17; (c) fire services; (d) transport services; and (e) border security.20  
 
There is no requirement, as there is in Australia, that a trade union seek permission to hold a 
ballot. All that is necessary is that notice of the ballot is given to the employer at least seven 
days before it is held and a sample voting paper is sent to the employer more than three days 
beforehand.21 On the other hand, the State will not bear the costs of the ballot; these must be 
met by the union itself. Where the number of those to be balloted exceeds 50 the ballot has to 
be overseen by an independent suitably qualified scrutineer and this process of managing and 
reporting on the ballot can be costly.22 
 
There must be sufficient information on the notice of ballot to tell the employer the categories 
of employee and potential workplaces affected as well as the numbers involved. This 
information ‘must be as accurate as is reasonably practicable in the light of the information in 
the possession of the union at the time’.23 There are also detailed provisions setting out what 
is to be placed on the voting paper itself (which must include a ‘health warning’ regarding the 
potential for dismissal) as well as the option for the action to be a strike or ‘short of a 
strike’.24 Following reforms introduced by the TUA, the voting paper must specify further 
‘the type or types of industrial action… either in the question itself or elsewhere on the ballot 
paper’ as well as ‘the period or periods within which the industrial action or, as the case may 
                                                          
16 University College London Hospital NHS Trust v Unison [1999] IRLR 31 (Court of Appeal); found not to be 
in violation of Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) by the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) in Unison v UK [2002] IRLR 497. 
17 See TULRCA 1992 s 226 – 234A; and the Code of Practice on Industrial Action Ballots and Notice to 
Employers available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/245421/05-1462-code-of-
practice-industrial-action-ballots-and-notice.pdf. 
18 TUA s 2 amending TULRCA s 226. 
19 TUA s 3 amending TULRCA s 226. 
20 TUA s 3 inserting after s 226A inter alia s 226(2E). See also the Government response to the consultation on 
ballot thresholds in important public services, January 2016, Annex B, ‘Skeleton regulations’ available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/493880/bis-16-15-consultation-
on-ballot-thresholds-in-important-public-services-government-response.pdf.  
21 TULRCA s 226A. 
22 TULRCA s 226B. 
23 TULRCA s 226A(2D). Although note that the names of employees need not be disclosed under s.226(2G). 
24 TULRCA s 229. 
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be, each type of industrial action is expected to take place’.25 It is unclear to what extent, if at 
all, the union may depart from what is set out subsequently, for example, in the context of 
negotiations aimed at averting action. Additionally, since 2016, the ballot paper ‘must include 
a reasonably detailed indication of the matter or matters in issue in the trade dispute to which 
the proposed industrial action relates’.26 This suggests that sufficient information must be 
given to those voting to enable them and the employer to ascertain whether this is a lawful 
trade dispute. If there are doubts, the employer may, for example, wish to seek injunctive 
relief to prevent the action from taking place; indeed the vague words ‘reasonably detailed’ 
almost invite litigation to avert a strike.27  
 
An industrial action ballot must be ‘secret’ and, for the time being, take place by post.28 The 
legislation is framed around each individual’s discrete choice rather than collective 
deliberative processes.29 There is little scope to rally support for voting in the workplace, so 
as to secure large numbers of returns. Rather, this is a discrete atomised process, in which 
each individual is responsible for their own return of the voting paper by mail. There is to be 
an independent review commissioned regarding introduction of electronic balloting, which 
unions hope would enhance turnout.30 However, the Secretary of State is not obliged to 
accept the results of any such review, but merely to publish the response laid before 
Parliament. A potential pilot scheme is envisaged in the event of a favourable response.31  
 
Further requirements are imposed regarding notice of the result of the ballot to all those 
entitled to vote and to the employer.32 After the TUA, that notice must not only state the 
number of votes cast, votes in favour, votes against and spoilt ballot papers, but also whether 
or not the number of votes cast is at least 50% of the number of individuals who were entitled 
to vote in the ballot and, where important public services are concerned, whether the requisite 
40% threshold is met.33 Then notice must be given to the employer of the industrial action 
itself, which since the TUA is to be given two weeks prior to its beginning (having been just 
one week previously).34 Action normally has to be taken  within four weeks of the date of the 
ballot, although this may be extended by agreement up to eight weeks or in the event of legal 
proceedings up to twelve weeks.35 Further, from 2016, the mandate given by a ballot to 
industrial action will expire six months after the date of the ballot (or up to nine months if the 
parties so agree), such that a ‘fresh ballot’ has to take place to authorise industrial action after 
this time (with the attendant costs this may incur).36 Again, any failure to comply with notice 
                                                          
25 TUA s 5 amending TULRCA, s 229 by inserting (2C) and (2D). 
26 TUA s 5 amending TULRCA s 229 by inserting (2B). 
27 As regards the excessive incidence of injunctive relief in UK courts, see N Countouris and M Freedland, 
Injunctions, Cyanamid and the Corrosion of the Right to Strike in the UK, UCL Working Paper, LRI WP 
1/2010, UCL, London 2010; and B Simpson ‘The Labour Injunction and Industrial Action Ballots’ (2013) 42 
ILJ 54.   
28 TULRCA s 230. 
29 Cf McCrystal and Novitz, above n 1. 
30 See Frances O’Grady, Trades Union Congress (TUC) General Secretary, on electronic balloting at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-29072893. 
31 TUA s 4.  
32 TULRCA s 231 and s 231A. 
33 TUA s 6 amending TULRCA s 231.  
34 TUA s 8. 
35 TULRCA ss 233, 234(1)-(6). 
36 TUA s 9 amending TULRCA s 234. 
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provisions and balloting requirements can lead to an action by the employer for injunctive 
relief.37 
 
In 1999, a ‘New Labour’ government introduced a key qualification to these procedural 
requirements, namely section 232B, which states that certain ‘small accidental failures’ that 
do not affect the result of the ballot can be disregarded.38 This provision still stands. It is 
limited in that it ostensibly concerns  only balloting and not notice provisions. The difficulties 
entailed in complying with the latter requirement are not accorded any formal statutory 
recognition.  
 
Nevertheless, it has been established by case law that a de minimis rule applies, such that a 
minor error or omission should not be taken to invalidate the notice when trade unions have 
done what is reasonable to comply with the statutory requirements.39 Notably, in a case 
decided in 2012, Balfour Beatty, it was acknowledged that: ‘Very sensitive issues of policy 
arise in this context as to where the balance should be struck between striving for democratic 
legitimacy and imposing unrealistic burdens on unions and their officers’.40 It is not sufficient 
to be ‘doing one's incompetent best or …being lax about taking proper steps to obtain the 
most up to date information available’,41 but neither should unreasonably stringent standards 
be demanded. ‘It cannot be right for a judge to hold that all reasonably practicable steps have 
not been taken merely because he or she would (as an outsider) have done something 
different.’42 The response of the Coalition Conservative-Liberal Democrat government to this 
judgment was to introduce a legislative requirement for trade unions to conduct a stringent 
‘membership audit’ which would inform the ballot notice and its conduct.43    
 
In the UK, the ready availability of injunctive relief has become notorious. Where employers 
think they have a prima facie case that the substantive or (more commonly) procedural 
requirements for statutory immunity were not met, then they can (under American Cyanamid 
principles)44 seek an injunction on the balance of convenience. Given the likely costs of 
industrial action to an employer, this ‘balance’ almost invariably would favour the employer. 
Although TULRCA s 221 provides that injunctive relief should be granted on the basis of the 
likelihood of the defence succeeding at trial, this approach has been neglected in much of the 
case law, which has permitted injunctive relief on the basis of very minor delays or 
inaccuracies in notice.45 In the Court of Appeal joined cases, RMT v SERCO and ASLEF v 
London & Birmingham Railway Ltd,46 Elias LJ noted that Article 11 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) protects a right to strike. The ECHR is an 
international instrument concluded under the auspices of the Council of Europe in 1950 and 
                                                          
37 Metrobus Ltd v Unite the Union [2009] IRLR 851. See R Dukes, ‘The Right to Strike: Not Much More Than 
A Slogan?’ (2010) 39 ILJ 82. In addition, there is now an obligation for a trade union to notify the Certification 
Officer in the ‘annual return’ regarding any industrial action taken: TUA, s 7 inserting TULRCA s 32ZA.   
38 TULRCA 1992, s 232B. 
39 See RMT v SERCO; ASLEF v London Birmingham Railway Ltd [2011] IRLR 399 at [87]. 
40 Balfour Beatty Engineering Services v Unite [2012] ICR 822, IRLR 452 at [32]. 
41 Ibid, at [34]. 
42 Ibid. 
43 The Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 (UK) ss 
32, 40.  
44 American Cyanamid Ltd v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 at 407.  
45 See for eg British Airways v Unite [2009] EWHC 3541, at [82]; EDF Energy Powerlink Ltd v National Union 
of Rail Maritime and Transport Workers [2010] IRLR 114; and Milford Haven Port Authority v Unite the Union 
[2010] EWCA Civ 400. For an example of the use of labour injunctions in this way in South Africa see C 
Cooper and P Benjamin, ‘Strike Ballots in South Africa’ (2016) 29 AJLL (forthcoming). 
46 See above n 39. 
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has domestic legal effect (being binding on public authorities such as the courts) by virtue of 
the Human Rights Act 1998. However, that recognition of a right to strike was not apparently 
sufficient to create a presumption in favour of legality of the workers’ collective action called 
by a trade union. Rather, the legislation regarding balloting and notice requirements has to be 
‘construed in the normal way, without presumptions one way or the other’ as to the 
superiority of union or employer interests.47  
 
To all this, must also be added the restrictions on industrial action which emerged under 
European Union (EU) law and which will continue to apply in the absence of ‘Brexit’. The 
EU is distinct from the Council of Europe, having a market orientation with its own legal 
order framed around freedom of movement (of goods, services, establishment and persons) as 
well as competition law.48 Respect for fundamental rights, including social rights, is 
recognised by the EU especially under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR). 
Notably, Article 28 of the EUCFR recognises the entitlement of workers to ‘take collective 
action to defend their interests, including strike action’. However, the right to strike operates 
as a constraint on the implementation of the market freedoms of EU law, rather than a basis 
for independent EU regulation.49 The Viking case established that where the exercise of a 
right to strike under national legislation obstructs the free movement of establishment by an 
employer, this can only be defensible if it is for the ‘protection of workers’ and 
proportionate.50 Further, the Laval case indicated that if collective action affects free 
movement of services and, in particular, collective bargaining over the minimum terms on 
which posted workers are hired, this interference can only be justified by demonstrating that 
there has been ‘social dumping’, presenting an even higher and uncertain threshold.51 If such 
defences cannot be established, the trade union calling the action can be found liable for 
potentially unlimited damages claimed by the employer.52 Court challenges based on EU law 
may become more prominent given the elaboration on the causes of the trade dispute now 
required to be set out in the ballot paper (from 2016 onwards).53    
 
2. The use of democratic rhetoric in adoption of a balloting and notice regime 
 
There remains considerable debate over the meaning of ‘democracy’ for these purposes. 
While, in an industrial relations context, democracy could be viewed as being achieved 
simply through individual choice exercised through voting whereby the views of the majority 
prevail, this seems a weak (and impoverished) understanding of democracy. Most societies 
that self-define as democratic also expect ‘to see precautions taken for the protection of 
                                                          
47 Ibid, at [9]. See also R Dukes, ‘The Right to Strike under UK Law: Something more than a slogan?’ (2011) 40 
ILJ 302. 
48 For an explanation, see T Novitz and P Syrpis, ‘Giving with One Hand and Taking with the Other: Protection 
of Workers’ Human Rights in the European Union’ in C Fenwick and T Novitz (eds) Human Rights at Work, 
Hart, Oxford, 2010. 
49 The legislative competence of the EU on social policy under Article 153(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU) ‘shall not apply to pay, the right of association, the right to strike or the right to 
impose lock-outs’. See also EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Articles 51 and 53. For further analysis, see T 
Novitz, ‘The EU and the Right to Strike: Regulation through the Back Door and its Impact on Social Dialogue’ 
(2016) 27(1) King’s Law Journal (KLJ) 46. 
50 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) and Finnish Seamen’s Union (FSU) v 
Viking Line [2007] ECR I-10779.  
51 Case C-341/05 Laval un Partneri v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767.  
52 K Apps, ‘Damages Claims Against Trade Unions after Viking and Laval’ (2009) 34 European Law Review 
141. See for a recent review of these issues, M Freedland and J Prassl (eds), Viking, Laval and Beyond, Hart, 
Oxford, 2014. 
53 See above, TUA s 5.  
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minorities and individual dissent, as a species of human rights protection’.54 Additionally, 
‘deliberative’ democracy, namely the attempt to remove barriers to communicative action has 
gained further credence in both the EU and UK (as well as Australia).55 This is an approach 
that stresses the importance of engagement with civil society and the transparent and genuine 
exchange of views whereby decisions may be reached by virtue of the strength of public 
reasoning, as opposed to the relative power of the interested parties. It is possible to detect, in 
the debates that surrounded legal reforms which took place in the UK during the 1980s and 
1990s some appeal to these different (but overlapping) understandings of democracy. Further, 
an appeal to ‘democracy’ has been a powerful invocation of legitimacy.  
 
Famously, mandatory ‘democratic’ balloting requirements in Britain were introduced by 
Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government with the explicit intention to address what was 
then seen as the tyranny of union leadership. Walk-outs led by shop stewards and votes taken 
on strike action by a show of hands were deemed coercive, despite their longstanding 
acceptance in UK industrial relations. The Conservative Government Green Paper on 
Democracy in Trade Unions stated that its aim was to return control of trade unions to 
members, prioritizing the interests of each individual member as opposed to the collective.56 
Part II of the Trade Union Act 1984 therefore imposed secret ballots in respect of those 
members a trade union found it reasonable to believe would be called upon to take industrial 
action (and required description of the consequences in the ballot paper, for this was to be 
informed choice). Statutory amendments to industrial legislation incrementally increased the 
bureaucratic demands associated with balloting, which were also supplemented with a 
detailed Code of Practice.57 Further, trade unions also lost the power to discipline members 
for failing to take industrial action regardless of trade union rulebooks. This was very much 
democracy as individual choice, such that it was not necessary even to abide by the majority 
decision.58 That ‘democratic’ rationale59 had, as Wedderburn observed, a neo-liberal 
flavour,60 reflecting the view expressed by Hayek that the negative freedom of persons was to 
be prioritised.61 The secret strike ballot offered ‘a highly atomistic form of participation 
requiring individuals to exercise their choice in the isolation of their own homes without 
further participation in debate and discussion’,62 lacking in deliberative potential.63  
 
The legislative reforms of the 1980s also had an economic dimension. They can be 
understood as a response to the recession experienced in the late 1970s and a discourse of 
economic decline. Those reforms offered a way in which to prevent inflationary wage 
settlements, but also to deflect worker opposition to dismissals and restructuring. The aim 
was to enable UK employers to become more competitive on international product markets 
                                                          
54 See McCrystal and Novitz, above n 1 at 121.  
55 Ibid, at 122 et seq.  
56 Cm 8778 (1983). P Davies and M Freedland, Labour Legislation and Public Policy, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1993 at 483-488.  
57 Davies and Freedland, above n 56 at 501 et seq.  
58 Employment Act 1988 (UK) s 3. 
59 See McCrystal and Novitz, above n 1 at 135 et seq. 
60 See Lord Wedderburn, ‘Labour Law and the Individual: Convergence or Diversity?’ in Lord Wedderburn, 
Labour Law and Freedom, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1995. 
61 FA Hayek, 1980s Unemployment and the Unions: Essays on the Impotent Price Structure of Britain and 
Monopoly in the Labour Market, 2nd edn., Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1984, 51-2.  
62 S Fredman, ‘The New Rights: Labour Law and Ideology in the Thatcher Years’ (1992) 12 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 24 at 29. 
63 M Ford, ‘Citizenship and Democracy in Industrial Relations: The Agenda for the 1990s’ (1992) 55 MLR 241. 
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while attracting foreign direct investment on the basis of a cheap labour force.64 The desire to 
remove ‘barriers to employment’ through a more flexible and efficient labour market 
surfaced during the 1980s.65 This was tantamount to reduction of trade union power,66 which 
led to a significant decrease in industrial action.67 The Conservative strategy did, however, 
backfire in one respect. Where unions could overcome the difficult hurdles of meeting all the 
detailed technical procedural requirements, and nevertheless achieved a majority in the ballot, 
which was very difficult, they had gained a hard won legitimacy for their action.68 When on 
strike, workers could claim a form of democratic entitlement.    
 
In a time of relative prosperity and economic stability during the 1990s and into the 
‘noughties’, ‘New Labour’ offered a ‘modernised’ and less conflictual vision of the role of 
trade unions within what might be regarded as a ‘third way’ or ‘deliberative’ model for 
industrial relations.69 Yet, despite (or perhaps because of) this shift in attitude, it was not 
much easier to engage in strikes than had previously been the case.  
 
The New Labour government saw no reason to depart from the legal framework established 
by previous Conservative governments, welcoming the end to ‘strikes without ballots’.70 
Instead, speeches given by the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to the Confederation of 
British Industry celebrated the flexibility of the labour market (‘the most flexible of any 
major economy’).71 There were also echoes of democratic rhetoric, so that Blair was prepared 
to say that trade unions were ‘a healthy part of any proper democracy’, but he also added that 
‘the best unions … are working in partnership with their employers’.72 This insistence on 
trade unions operating through ‘partnership’ rather than conflict would seem to indicate a 
shift in orientation from majoritarian to deliberative democracy.73 This transition was evident 
                                                          
64 B Towers, ‘Running the Gauntlet: British Trade Unions under Thatcher, 1979–1988’ (1989) 42 Industrial & 
Labor Relations Review 163. 
65 See the White Papers: Employment: The Challenge for the Nation (1985) Cm. 9474, Employment for the 
1990s Cm. 540 (1988) and the Green Paper Removing Barriers to Employment Cm 655 (1989). 
66 Davies and Freedland, above n 56 at 517 et seq; and Regarding the effects of the legal framework, see R 
Freeman and J Pelletier ‘The Impact of Industrial Relations Legislation on British Union Density’ (1990) 2 
British Journal of Industrial Relations (BJIR) 141 at 156. Coverage of collective bargaining fell from 70% of all 
employees in 1984 to 41% in 1998. See M Cully, S Woodland, A O’Reilly and G Dix, Britain at Work: As 
Depicted by the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey, Routledge, London, 1999 at 235 - 42.  Trade 
union membership as at 2014 stood at less than 29%. See 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/431564/Trade_Union_Membersh
ip_Statistics_2014.pdf; and http://www.worker-participation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Countries/United-
Kingdom/Collective-Bargaining. 
67 Industrial action has declined from 32,129,000 working days lost in 1980, to 1,338,000 in 1997. By 2014, the 
sum was only 483,000. See the latest Office for National Statistics records at: 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_385648.pdf 
68 J Elgar and B Simpson, Industrial Ballots and the Law, Institute of Employment Rights, London, 1996, 20-
21; and R Undy, P Fosh, H Morris, P Smith and R Martin, Managing Trade Unions: The Impact of Legislation 
on Trade Union Behaviour, OUP, Oxford 1996, 260-1. 
69 T Novitz and P Skidmore, Fairness at Work: A Critical Analysis of the Employment Relations Act 1999 and 
its Treatment of Collective Rights, Oxford, Hart, 2001; P Smith and G Morton, ‘New Labour’s Reform of 
Britain’s Employment Law: the devil is not only in the details but in the policy too’ (2001) 39 BJIR 119; A 
Bogg, ‘New Labour, Trade Unions, and the Liberal State’ (2009) 20 KLJ 403. 
70 See the White Paper, Fairness at Work Cm3968 (1998), Foreword by Tony Blair.  
71 Speech by Tony Blair to the CBI in 2001 available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/05/september11.usa2; see also speech to the CBI in 1997, 
available at: http://www.ukpol.co.uk/2015/09/07/tony-blair-1997-speech-to-the-cbi/. 
72 See http://www.theguardian.com/politics/1997/apr/27/election2001.uk1, in which the Guardian newspaper 
reports an interview in May 1997.  
73 McCrystal and Novitz, above n 1 at 142-144.  
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in section 238A of TULRCA (introduced by New Labour in 1999) which sought to 
encourage non-conflictual communication by the design of protection from dismissal for 
workers participating in industrial action. If the union of which the employee is a member is 
willing to take all appropriate steps to resolve the dispute and behaves rationally during this 
period, then the ‘protected period’ for dismissal can be extended beyond the standard period 
of twelve weeks from the commencement of the action.74 There is an assumption here that 
more can be achieved through effective communication than through conflict, as  might be 
the case in an ideal world.  
 
The inadequacies of the New Labour approach to UK industrial relations have been explored 
elsewhere and that approach certainly did not revitalize trade union representation or 
collective bargaining.75 What is notable in respect of the most recent legal reforms under the 
TUA is that democracy is no longer such a significant part of the rhetorical game played by 
the now Conservative Government. There is now a further move away from democratic 
justifications towards a particular kind of explicit economic pragmatism. 
 
3. Economic justifications for the TUA 
 
Democratic values were less prominent in the justifications offered for the TUA. Rather the 
reasons for the reforms were largely pragmatic and economic in character. The aim of the 
legislation appeared to be utilitarian, namely to maximise wealth.  
 
Adopting a contemporary political economy perspective, wealth maximisation may (as 
Picketty has explained)76 serve the interests of a small elite group of the very rich, as opposed 
to society generally. In the UK, the income gap between wealthy and poor is steadily 
increasing, with all the social ills this encompasses. 77 While there are strong indications that 
effective trade union representation and collective bargaining could close the income gap,78 
this strategy for repairing societal fracture is being resisted.  
 
That resistance is taking place in the context of the global financial crisis, for which the 
mainstream recipe has been austerity. Austerity programs have tended to involve the 
reduction of wages, removal of job security and diminution of collective bargaining 
mechanisms. In part, this has been an endeavour to reduce public spending, in order to reduce 
the public debt generated by the monies used to assist financial institutions in the wake of the 
crisis. These policy prescriptions have also been part of an effort to boost growth in the 
domestic economy, with an effort to assist employers in making profits and attract foreign 
direct investors, (hence the need for lower wages and reduction of collective bargaining 
which could create wage premiums).79 In this setting, the prioritization of economic 
                                                          
74 TULRCA s 238A. See text accompanying ns 9 – 11 above.  
75 McCrystal and Novitz, above n 1 at 144 – 146; see also P Smith and G Morton, ‘Nine Years of New Labour: 
Neoliberalism and Workers’ Rights’ (2006) 44 BJIR 401.  
76 T Picketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 2014. 
77 L Hayes and T Novitz, Trade Unions and Economic Inequality, CLASS/Institute of Employment Rights, 
London/Liverpool, 2014 available at: http://classonline.org.uk/pubs/item/trade-unions-and-economic-inequality.  
78 Ibid, and see more recently (and controversially) F Jaumotte and CA Buitron, Power from the People IMF, 
Washington, 2015 available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2015/03/pdf/jaumotte.pdf.  
79 For this general austerity-related trend, see J Peters, ‘Neoliberal Convergence in North America and Western  
Europe: Fiscal Austerity, Privatization, and Public Sector Reform’ (2012) 19(2) Rev. Int’l Pol. Economy 208 
especially 218 et seq. There is also a vast array of literature on the implications of EU-led austerity including: S 
Clauwert and I Schömann, The Crisis and National Labour Law Reforms: A Mapping Exercise, ETUI Working 
Paper, Florence, 2014; A Koukiadaki and L Kretsos, ‘Opening Pandora's Box: The Sovereign Debt Crisis and 
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objectives (arguably always a feature of the EU market agenda raising concerns regarding a 
‘democratic deficit’) has become starker. 80  
 
On election to government in May 2015, the Chancellor, George Osborne, announced £12 
billion of spending cuts.81 In the Queen’s Speech, which sets out the legislative agenda for 
the parliamentary year ahead, it was said (tellingly) that: ‘My government will continue with 
its long-term plan to provide economic stability and security... They will continue the work of 
bringing the public finances under control and reducing the deficit, so Britain lives within its 
means. Measures will be introduced to raise the productive potential of the economy ...’82 In 
the list of measures that followed, the fifth was ‘legislation to reform trade unions and to 
protect essential public services against strikes’.83 Government ministers in the Commons and 
the Lords did claim ‘democratic’ legitimacy for the TUA.84 However, their claims were 
undermined by the failure of the Conservative Government to meet, in the General Election 
of 2015, the ‘democratic’ balloting thresholds they advocated for ‘important’ public sector 
industrial action.85 
 
It would therefore seem that the measures proposed in the Trade Union Bill 2015 (now the 
TUA) were intended, largely, to fulfil economic objectives or as the Minister put it, to 
preserve ‘the economic welfare of the nation’.86 The high threshold of support for ballots in 
‘important public services’ can be linked to an attempt to ensure that trade union action 
would not interfere with wage cuts, restructuring and redundancies entailed in bringing public 
finances under control. Indeed, this would diminish the ability of trade unions to challenge 
the impact on members of privatization of public services, treatment of junior doctors and 
creation of universal academy schools being a live issue at the time that the Bill was 
debated.87 In this respect, the slippage from mention of ‘essential public services’ to reference 
to ‘important public services’ in the TUA was significant. While ILO supervisory bodies 
would allow restrictions on strikes to prevent danger to ‘the life, personal safety or health of 
the whole or part of the population’,88 the UK Government’s aim here was rather to reduce 
public spending and thereby the national budgetary deficit.89 For this reason, the ILO 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Labour Regulation in Greece’ (2012) 41(3) ILJ 276; and R Torres, ‘European Labour Markets in Crisis’ (2012) 
152 ILRev 167, 168. 
80 See F W Scharpf, ‘Economic Integration, Democracy and the Welfare State’ (1997) 4 Journal of European 
Public Policy 18; L Betten, ‘The Democratic Deficit of Participatory Democracy in Community Social Policy’ 
(1998) 23 European Law Review 20; and B Bercusson, ‘Democratic Legitimacy and European Labour Law’ 
(1999) 28 ILJ 153. 
81 See discussion at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/06/20/uk-britain-economy-cuts-
idUKKBN0P00VH20150620. 
82 Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/queens-speech-2015. 
83 Ibid.  
84 See Hansard, House of Commons (HC), 14 September 2015, col. 761 per Sajid Javid;  and House of Lords 
(HL), Trade Union Bill, Second Reading 11 January 2016, col. 13 per Baroness Neville-Rolfe.  
85 Hansard HL, Trade Union Bill, Second Reading 11 January 2016, col. 13 per Baroness Bakewell at col. 41 
noted that Conservatives had not gained the 40% approval threshold of all those eligible to vote. 
86 Hansard HC, 14 September 2015, col. 772 per Sajid Javid. 
87 Hansard HL, Trade Union Bill, Second Reading 11 January 2016, col.20 per Baroness Burt of Solihull; see 
also HL, 8 Feb 2016 : Column 1991 per Lord Watson of Invergowrie (Lab). 
88 ILO Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) Digest of Decisions, 5th ed, ILO, Geneva, 2006, at [585]. 
See also the specific observation of the ILO Committee of Experts (CEACR) on UK compliance with 
Convention No. 87 (2015) available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:3255351. 
89 A desire to prevent the ongoing junior doctors’ action in the NHS was for example observed during 
Parliamentary debates; see per Rachael Maskell and Helen Hayes in the Hansard HC consideration of Lords’ 
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Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) 
requested: ‘the Government to review this matter with the social partners concerned … so as 
to ensure that the heightened requirement of support of 40 per cent of all workers does not 
apply to education and transport services’.90 There has been no sign of such a review to date. 
 
Further, the reference in the 2015 Queen’s Speech to the ‘productive potential of the 
economy’91 assists in explaining the measures taken which apply not only to the public but 
also to the private sector. For example, the more general threshold turnout requirement of 
50% and the more detailed voting paper requirements both limit potential access to strikes 
and thereby the bargaining power of workers generally, indirectly offering benefits to 
potential employers considering investment in the UK economy.   
 
The ‘Background Notes’ to the Queen’s Speech of 2015 did make some small mention of 
‘democratic’ objectives, stating that aims of the new trade union legislation would be: 
‘Ensuring that strikes are the result of clear, positive and recent decisions by union members’ 
and ‘[e]nsuring that disruption to essential public services has a democratic mandate’.92 
However, this seemed to mean ‘democratic’ in the sense of ‘super-majority’ voting not yet 
contemplated in other parts of British public life, and overlooked human rights protection 
such as the entitlement to freedom of association. The latter was perhaps not surprising, given 
the threat made by the Conservative Party prior to the election, that if elected, there would be 
renegotiation of the UK’s commitment to implementation of the judgments of the European 
Court of Human Rights under the ECHR.93 Subsequently, little reference has been made by 
the Conservative Government to ‘democratic’ objectives, with other ambitions taking 
prominence.  
 
One of the three consultation papers issued with the Trade Union Bill (later the TUA) was 
specifically devoted to Ballot Thresholds in Important Public Services.94 It is perhaps notable 
that there was no consultation on other aspects of the Bill’s provisions, such as the changes to 
voting paper requirements, additional strike notice provisions and limitation on the duration 
of a ballot mandate.95 This consultation paper said that disruptive action based on low ballot 
turnouts was ‘undemocratic’, presumably being aimed at an explanation of the 50% turnout 
threshold. However, it seems doubtful that the Conservative government genuinely wished to 
promote greater participation in strike ballots, since the legislative requirement for a report on 
electronic balloting, as a means by which this could be achieved, was agreed only reluctantly 
by the Government due to pressure from trade unions and the House of Lords.96 Further, this 
was the first and last mention of ‘democracy’ in this consultation paper.97 Instead, the key 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
amendments on 27 April 2016; available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2016-04-
27/debates/16042764000002/TradeUnionBill. 
90 See above, n 88.  
91 See above, n 82. 
92 Queen’s Speech 2015: Backgrounding Briefing Notes (27 May 2015) at 38 available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/queens-speech-2015-background-briefing-notes. 
93 http://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/may/27/threat-exit-human-rights-act-convention-dropped-tories-
cameron; http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/david-cameron-refuses-to-rule-out-quitting-the-
european-convention-on-human-rights-10294385.html. 
94 https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/trade-union-bill. 
95 Even though the newer lengthy notice period of 14 days was such a significant step as to merit a Direct 
Request to the UK Government from the CEACR (in 2016). See 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:3255355:YES.   
96 HC consideration of Lords’ amendments on 27 April 2016, see above, n 89. 
97 See n 94 above at [3] - though curiously the term reappears in BIS/15/416, [18]. 
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objectives were ‘to ensure that industrial action is only used as a measure of last resort’;98 and 
to avoid the far-reaching effects of strikes in public services. Reference to what might be 
‘democratic’ (or otherwise) was replaced by appeal to the need for ‘clear and ongoing 
support’.  
 
This phraseology and the notion of the need in ‘important public services’ for 40% approval 
of those eligible for vote had a precedent. It was set, not by a Conservative government, but 
by New Labour in 1999 in respect of balloting thresholds for statutory recognition of a union 
so as to enable collective bargaining on pay, hours and holidays. Statutory recognition must 
be supported ‘by a majority of the workers voting’ and ‘at least 40 per cent of the workers 
constituting the bargaining unit’.99 As was observed at the time, a ‘yes’ vote from 40% of the 
electorate was more than the Labour Party received in the 1997 general election, which was 
widely regarded as a landslide victory.100 Today, there is no such super-majority requirement 
in respect of any other election for political representation in the UK or in Europe (nor is 
there any turnout threshold).101 As the 40% rule could not be defended on a democratic basis, 
the then Labour government articulated the issue as follows: ‘First, without real and 
substantial support amongst employees, collective bargaining simply will not work. Second, 
since collective bargaining has an impact on all employees, not just those claiming union 
representation, it is right that it should be granted only in circumstances where substantial 
support is demonstrated.’102  
 
That iteration of ‘substantial’ or ‘clear’ or ‘clear and ongoing’ support is now relied on by the 
Conservative government due to the ‘far-reaching effects on significant numbers of ordinary 
people who have no association with the dispute’. The 40% requirement is apparently 
designed to ‘get the balance right between the interests of union members and the interests of 
the majority of people who rely on the services they provide’.103 The initial Impact 
Assessment (IA) of 2015, which attempted to provide a monetary picture of this balance,104 
was found by the UK Regulatory Policy Committee (RPC) not to provide ‘a clear enough 
basis for consultation’.105 The second IA issued in January 2016,106 rated by the RPC this 
time as ‘fit for purpose’, provided a second opportunity to explain the rationale for the 
Conservative Government policy, which is done in terms of what is ‘democratic’107 but also 
in the language ‘clear’ support.108 The IA estimated that the 50% turnout requirement would 
reduce work stoppages by 37%, with the 40% threshold reducing industrial action by a 
further 8%. The 50% threshold is costed as saving the ‘sectors’ affected upwards a total of 
£11 million per annum; while the full costing for 40% threshold is only to be provided when 
the relevant secondary legislation regarding ‘important public services’ is set before 
Parliament.109 Costings are provided relating to union familiarisation and adjustment to the 
                                                          
98 BIS/15/418 at [1]. Discussed in Ford and Novitz, above n 2 at 530. 
99 TULRCA, Schedule A1, [29], inserted by the Employment Relations Act 1999 (UK).  
100 Novitz and Skidmore, above n 69 at 94. 
101 See R Darlington and J Dobson, The Conservative Government’s Proposed Strike Ballot Thresholds: The 
Challenge to Trade Unions, Institute of Employment Rights, Liverpool, 2015 at 11. 
102 White Paper, Fairness at Work Cm3968 (1998), [4.16]. 
103 BIS/15/418 at 3-4. 
104 Impact Assessment, Ballot Thresholds in Important Public Services (July 2015) BIS/15/418 IA. 
105 RPC15-BIS-2402 (2015).  
106 Impact Assessment, Trade Union Bill 2016 (January 2016) BIS/16/70 available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/493636/BIS-16-70-trade-union-
bill-impact-assessment.pdf. 
107 Ibid, at 23, 85, 87 and 94. 
108 Ibid, 5, 11, 22, 23 
109 Ibid, 11. 
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new legislation as if these are the only effects on unions and their members by virtue of 
reduced access to industrial action;110 the impact on the income of workers and issues of 
profit-sharing are entirely overlooked.   
 
However, even the savings of £11 million a year identified by the IA (less than £8 million 
approximately in respect of strikes in important public services) 111 does not get the 
Government close to Osbourne’s target cuts of £12 billion. The economic explanation is 
arguably important but lies elsewhere. It emerged in the written evidence submitted regarding 
the Trade Union Bill and, in particular that of Tom Flanagan Consulting,112 which reveals the 
relevance of a Policy Exchange (Conservative think tank) document of 2010 titled 
‘Modernising Industrial Relations’ (of which Flanagan was a co-author).113 That policy paper 
reads like a shopping list for the measures adopted in the TUA: more detailed information on 
the ballot paper; requiring that a majority of employees in the balloted workplace vote; 
establishing different rules for ‘essential’ goods and services; extension of notice period for 
strikes to fourteen days; permitting use of agency staff as replacement labour; imposing opt-
in (rather than opt-out) choices for  political funds; and stipulating  that ‘no union 
membership fee should be deducted directly from a pay packet’.114 Indeed, the resemblance 
to the content of the legislation is uncanny. There is also in this list a measure already taken 
by the former Coalition Government in 2014, namely ‘an annual audit of union 
membership’.115  
 
In the Policy Exchange paper, unions are conceived solely as a mechanism to curb the 
‘monopsony power’ of certain dominant employers and thereby achieving a legitimate wage 
premium where wages have been driven down ‘below the efficient market equilibrium 
level’.116 On this basis, the entitlement to withdraw labour can only be justified collectively, 
rather than individually; hence the case for aggregating preferences via balloting thresholds 
and super-majorities. Unions are there to reduce transaction costs (which would follow from 
individually negotiated wages) and to counterbalance monopsony power, but only to the 
extent that the latter cannot be addressed through competition law.117  
 
Following the authors’ reasoning, further reforms advocated in the Policy Exchange paper 
could still be introduced, such as reduction of protections from unfair dismissal for 
participants in industrial action118 and judicial review of action which causes ‘significant 
economic damage’.119 Further, the paper advocates breaking up large unions and making 
them compete as ‘service providers’.120  
 
                                                          
110 Ibid, 6 and 12-18. 
111 Ibid, 27. 
112 Hansard HC TUB 42, 28 October 2015. 
113 ‘Policy Exchange Paper (2010)’ available at: 
http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/modernising%20industrial%20relations%20-
%20sep%2010.pdf 
114 Ibid, 5-7.  
115 Ibid, 6. See TULRCA, s 24 and ss 24ZA – ZK introduced by Part 3 of the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-
Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 (UK). 
116 Policy Exchange Paper (2010), 25. 
117 Ibid, 26. 
118 Ibid, 38. 
119 Ibid, at 39 
120 Ibid, at 27-28. 
14 
 
This is a peculiarly narrow economic agenda; and it is worth remembering that there are 
alternatives. Also arguing within an economic paradigm, Marc Moore has argued that 
industrial action does not lead to the ‘resource misallocation’ alleged by neo-liberals such as 
Hayek,121 but rather that ‘adversarial counter-pressures’ are necessary to labour acquiescence 
in the managerial discretion required in capitalist systems.122 According to this alternative 
narrative, the ability to strike promotes, rather than detracts from, administrative efficiency, 
reducing agency costs and enabling economies in production costs.123 Moreover, it has long 
been recognised that laws promoting and protecting trade union activity can have beneficial 
developmental effects, from an institutional economics perspective.124 Further, the paucity of 
the Policy Exchange prescriptions lie in their disregard for the notion of development as 
freedom, which would encompass access to freedom of association as a matter of dignity as 
well as democracy.125 Nevertheless, thus far, it would seem to this very limited economic 
rationale that is driving balloting and notice reform in the UK.        
 
4. Conclusion  
 
There remains scope for challenge of the recent UK balloting and notice requirements within 
the ILO and under Council of Europe human rights mechanisms.126 In this respect, the 
sensitivity of Elias LJ in the Court of Appeal to international jurisprudence on the right to 
strike is reassuring,127 but it is doubtful that human rights protections can altogether 
compensate for the evaporation of attention to democratic values. Even though labour law 
commentators (including the present author) were critical of and concerned by some 
‘democratic’ justifications given for past UK balloting and notice statutory provisions, the 
narrow economic justificatory basis offered by the current Conservative government places a 
greater constraint on the ways in which procedural requirements are to be imposed and 
applied. The dominance of a such a narrow macro-economic justification for balloting and 
notice reforms is worrying, especially where this goes beyond a temporary desire to reduce 
public debt, and tends instead towards a more far-reaching neo-liberal understanding of UK 
industrial relations centred around transactional costs and monopsony. The outcome is likely 
to be significantly reduced access to industrial action alongside the further erosion of 
bargaining power and voice for UK workers.  
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123 Ibid, at 427-8. 
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